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Abstract 
Strategic interaction between gas and electricity sectors is a major issue in the implementation of 
competitive energy markets. One relevant aspect of the problem is the potential for input foreclosure 
between gas and power industries. In this paper, we are concerned with situations where input 
foreclosure opportunities are associated with the choice of market design. In particular, we study input 
foreclosure in the case that the short-term capacity allocation mechanism of gas networks raises 
barriers to cross-border trade. In that situation, one may find gas markets that are isolated only in the 
short term. We explain players' ability to influence the electricity price using their gas decisions in 
those isolated markets. We also show that this should be a concern of EU capacity allocation 
mechanisms, which provide spatial flexibility in the short term to promote liquidity, at the cost of 
creating barriers to cross-border trade. Therefore, input foreclosure opportunities are additional costs 
to be taken into account when weighing benefits and drawbacks of European gas market designs. 
Keywords 
Market design; Input foreclosure; Gas-power interaction; Network economics.  
1. Introduction*
The integration of gas and electricity companies has attracted signiﬁcant
attention in the last decade. This convergence encompasses a variety of eﬀects
and it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd a uniﬁed framework to analyze the problem. The
approach of this paper is based on considering that production of electricity
using gas as primary fuel has become a relevant part of the demand in the
gas industry. In that view, it is possible to look at part of the gas industry
as an intermediate product in the supply chain of electricity. Hence, gas-
electricity convergence may be viewed as a playing ﬁeld for the theory of
vertical integration.
As shown by Joskow (2005), there is not one uniﬁed theory of vertical inte-
gration Barquín et al. (2006) and Padilla et al. (2006) showed the diﬃculty
to deﬁne a uniﬁed academic position on the topic. Vertical integration en-
compasses diﬀerent aspects of the same problem, including a number of eﬃ-
ciency increasing eﬀects. In fact, a large stream of the literature is devoted to
show that vertical integration has in many cases beneﬁcial eﬀects, see for in-
stance Williamson (1975). Loosely, when assets are speciﬁc and, for instance,
contracts are considerably incomplete and/or uncertainty is relevant, large
transaction costs may justify vertical integration. From this standpoint, gas
and electricity assets are in fact speciﬁc, contracts are incomplete and uncer-
tainty is relevant. Thus, one will likely ﬁnd cases where vertical integration
between gas and electricity companies responds to industry needs.
On the other hand, vertical integration may also allow the existence of oppor-
tunities to raise prices anti-competitively. In particular, vertical integration
may be used to harm competition in the case of input foreclosure, Ordover
et al. (1990) or Hart and Tirole (1990). It describes a situation where the
vertical ﬁrm can increase his rivals' costs by manipulating the prices in the
upstream market and therefore can beneﬁt from higher prices in the down-
stream market. When applied to gas-electricity integration, this would in
theory allow a vertically-integrated ﬁrm to exercise increased market power
in electricity if it controls somehow the gas market. Hunger (2003) analyzed
the problem in the context of gas-power mergers in the US. He shows that gas
producers may raise rivals' costs in the power market by raising gas contract
prices.
In practice, when trade can happen both at the long-term markets and at the
short-term markets, the rules of exchange may have an important impact on
market results. In particular, we show that analyzing only long-term trans-
actions does not give a complete description of the problem. A ﬁrst eﬀect of
this is studied in Vazquez and Barquín (2007), which describes a situation
*The authors are grateful to Carlos Vazquez and Ana Berzosa for fruitful discussions.
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where large players may beneﬁt from avoiding to sell or buy at the short
term, thus draining liquidity from the spot market. Under this strategy, any
small deviation or imbalance can be managed internally by the large play-
ers. But these imbalances are highly penalized for the smaller ones, as they
cannot ﬁnd counter-part for trading in the short-term market.
In this paper, we show that short-term network allocation may be an ad-
ditional source of opportunities for strategic behavior. The idea behind this
is that the design of gas markets implies the deﬁnition of a mechanism to
allocate network capacity, and such mechanism needs to deal with the trade-
oﬀ eﬃciency/liquidity, ?. This trade-oﬀ comes from the fact that market
arrangements in gas industries have to deal with the strong speciﬁcity of
gas networks, which in turn is the source of signiﬁcant transaction costs,
Williamson (1975), Williamson (1983) and Williamson (1985). In that view,
market designs have faced the trade-oﬀ between maintaining gas network
speciﬁcity (and hence obtaining eﬃcient network allocation) and reducing
speciﬁcity by deﬁning simpliﬁed common standards for products (at the cost
reducing eﬃciency). These simpliﬁed standards would be less speciﬁc and
hence easier to trade in markets see Riordan and Williamson (1985) for a
general treatment of this problem.
So the implementation of market arrangements in gas industries is faced
with a trade-oﬀ "eﬃciency versus transaction costs". In this paper, we do
not aim at giving general recommendations to decide on this trade-oﬀ, but
at identifying additional costs of reducing transaction costs by simplifying
network services. These additional costs are associated with increased oppor-
tunities for input foreclosure in the short run. We show in this paper that,
even if long-term gas markets are relatively competitive, market designers
should be concerned with market power opportunities in the short run. Put
it diﬀerently, even if the market for producers and suppliers (a long-term
market) is competitive enough, ineﬃcient network allocation may result in
isolated short-term markets where gas suppliers may be highly concentrated,
and hence in strong cases for input foreclosure.
However, assessing generally the potential for those isolated markets to ap-
pear is signiﬁcantly complex in gas markets, as there is no uniﬁed design
for network allocation mechanisms. The US market is based on long-term
pipeline contracting, complemented with considerably liquid secondary ca-
pacity trading. In the Victoria gas market, trading was implemented through
implicit auctions based on gas prices. The EU relies as well on secondary
network capacity trading. In that view, the rules governing such secondary
trading are central in the analysis of potential opportunities to foreclose the
market. Both the US and the Australia mechanisms are based on highly eﬃ-
cient mechanisms to allocate capacity. In the EU, capacity allocation mech-
anisms create trading zones in order to increase liquidity within those zones.
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This in turn creates barriers to cross-zone trading in the short run. National
short-term markets may be isolated from the rest of European markets, and
thus the potential for input foreclosure may be relevant. In that view, the
opportunities to foreclose the market are motivated by the capacity alloca-
tion mechanism, and hence will be softened if it were substituted for a more
eﬃcient mechanism.
We will adopt a model-based approach to explain the impact of the ver-
tical eﬀects. Our model will be aimed at explaining the eﬀects of vertical
integration when there are opportunities to foreclose the short-term market.
With that formalization, we will then discuss whether regulation facilitates
the existence of such eﬀects. This in turn allows us to identify additional
costs of European network regulation1. If one sees vertical integration as a
compromise between eﬃciency-increasing eﬀects and increased opportunities
to behave strategically, network regulations that allocate network capacity
more eﬃciently would reduce the opportunities for strategic interaction.
We begin in section 2 by describing the interaction between gas and elec-
tricity markets that we consider in this paper. In section 2.1, we develop
a model to study the vertical eﬀects between the downstream gas market
and the power market. Section 4 analyzes the model and obtains general
factors to characterize input foreclosure situations. Section 5 provides policy
implications of the previous results. Finally, section 6 collects our conclusion.
Formalization details are developed in the Appendix.
2. The interaction between European gas and
electricity markets
In the setting we will be considering in this paper, there is a long-term
gas international market with time frames of about 10 or 20 where all
players in a certain market can attend to buy their gas supplies. There is
also a short-term gas market with horizons from several hours to several
months where market participants buy and sell gas to manage deviations
from their expected plans. Both markets require purchasing the associated
transmission rights. Such market for transmission rights is critical to analyze
the opportunities for input foreclosure.
Actually, one needs to diﬀerentiate between long-term markets for transmis-
sion and secondary trading of transmission rights. The logic for this is that
the liquidity of each market might be quite diﬀerent, and lack of liquidity
in markets for transmission rights may create barriers to trade the gas com-
modity. If there are barriers to trade transmission rights, it is sensible to
1EU network regulation is based on entry/exit zones where shippers need to balance
injections and withdrawals only on a daily basis.
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expect the existence of regional markets. In those regional markets, the gas
market structure would tend to be horizontally concentrated and thus the
opportunities for input foreclosure would increase.
The strategy we pursue in this paper is to characterize ﬁrst a game where
those barriers to trade transmission in the short run exist. With the game
characterization, we will be able to study formally the opportunities for
input-foreclosure strategies. Furthermore, we will identify the key parameters
that determine the potential for input foreclosure. By the analysis of that
game, thus, we will study whether or not one ﬁnds those barriers to trade,
which will be the aim of section 4.
We consider thus the market as made up of three consecutive stages. First, all
agents go to the long-term gas market to purchase their basic gas contracts.
We assume that they are all small compared with the size of the market,
so they act as pure price-takers, even if there are other players in that mar-
ket that are acting strategically relaxing this assumption adds the eﬀects
studied in Hunger (2003). Therefore, from the strategic interaction point of
view, this stage will be irrelevant for us; we will just reﬂect it through an
long-term gas price that we will take as constant for the following stages.
Second, the short-term gas market takes place. All gas end-consumers buy
their energy in this market, and there is a price-elasticity associated with
them. Typically, the price in this market results to be higher than the long-
term price. Besides, gas-ﬁred power plants buy their opportunity gas in this
market. We will assume that this opportunity gas is sold at the same price
that resulted from the national gas market. The price will never be lower than
that, since otherwise arbitrageurs could sell all their long-term-contracted
gas in the end-user gas market and buy extra gas afterwards with a proﬁt.
This would tend to level both prices and will surely erode the ability of the
oligopolists to withhold gas quantity. Therefore the extra gas will be sold at
least at the short-term gas price. It could be more expensive than that, since
the constraint on the opportunity gas purchases to be positive limits the pos-
sibility of arbitrage here. In practice, it is likely that it will be approximately
the retail gas price plus some mark-up, depending on the willingness to pay
of the buyers and other characteristics of this market. Although we have not
modeled explicitly this eﬀect, including it would result in additional oppor-
tunities to behave strategically. Suppliers in this short-term market have to
decide how much they would sell at this stage, considering that they may
want to reserve some gas for electricity production at the following stage.
The needs of gas contracted in advance for electricity production are un-
certain. In addition, we assume that suppliers in the short-term market are
concentrated enough to manipulate the price. This assumption is made in
order to formalize the idea that regional markets may exist only in the short
run. We will model this by assuming that suppliers play Cournot strategies
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in this market.
Third, the electricity market takes place. Each gas-ﬁred generator may use
the remaining part of his contracted gas with no additional cost. However,
since gas purchases are made many years in advance from the actual elec-
tricity market, uncertainty is high and additional amounts of gas may be
required. The short-term gas market is not liquid enough, so electricity pro-
ducers have to buy this extra gas to the few ﬁrms that do trade in the short
run.
2.1. Formalization of the game
Most of the models concerned with strategic behavior in gas markets focus
on the relationship between the upstream and downstream of gas markets,
assuming that some of their players are oligopolists. To our knowledge, the
ﬁrst work modeling market power in gas markets is Mathisien et al. (1987).
In Mulder and Zwart (2005) the gas market is represented by means of a
small number of strategic gas producers, and price-taking gas traders in the
downstream market. Boots et al. (2004) model the gas market as a sequence
of oligopolistic markets in gas production (upstream) and trading (down-
stream). Holtz et al. (2008) model the same structure of the market, but
relax some assumptions of Boots et al. (2004), such as the approach of mod-
eling the domestic production as an exogenous variable.
The aim of our study, on the other hand, is to analyze the interaction between
the gas and the electricity market in the short run. In that view, a relevant
part of that interaction takes place between the downstream gas market
and the electricity market. So in our model, we represent a sequence of an
oligopolistic gas market (the short-term market) and an oligopolistic power
market. We thus implicitly assume a competitive upstream gas market. In
doing so, our modeling strategy will be close to Barquín (2006) and Crampes
and Hernandez-Alva (2007).
Summing up, we will describe the interaction between electricity and gas
markets as a two-stage game, where the electricity market players decide
their output in the electricity market once the gas market has cleared. We
model the two markets as non-cooperative games in quantities.
To set up the game, we ﬁrst deﬁne the proﬁt-maximization problem of each
ﬁrm. The problem we will describe in this section builds on a market made
up of N ﬁrms with positions both in the gas and in the electricity markets.
The time-uncertainty setting is deﬁned by two periods (date 0 and date 1),
and S states of nature at date 1. It represents a situation where the gas
market takes place at date 0 subject to an uncertain power market at date
1. The possible states at date 1 will be denoted by s = 1, . . . , S.
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In addition, player i ∈ N has a preference ordering on the revenues set
Ri = Ri0, . . . , R
i
S , and we will assume that the ordering can be expressed by
a utility function:
U i : <S+1 → <
This utility function, thus, deﬁnes the producers' preferences for each state
of nature, and it is assumed transitive, convex and complete.
Gas market decisions are deﬁned by the maximization of the income in the
short-term market, pigV i, where pig is the price of the gas market and V i
is the ﬁrm i's sales in the gas market. In addition, all ﬁrms must purchase
their gas sales from a certain gas producer. This step is not represented in
the model, and we assume all the trades have been made before short-term
decisions take place. It is summarized by the variable Ai, which represents
the gas purchases of ﬁrm i ∈ N . Hence, ﬁrm i buys the amount Ai in advance
both for selling in the gas market and for producing electricity. The price of
the gas supplies bought in advance through long-term contracts is denoted
by pg.
In the power market stage, pips is the price of the electricity market at state
s and cis is the ﬁrm i's variable cost of her non-gas-ﬁred power plants. q
N,i
s is
the ﬁrm i's output of her non-gas-ﬁred power plants. qG,is is the ﬁrm i's gas
purchases in the gas markets to produce with of her gas-ﬁred power plants.
qC,is is the ﬁrm i's part of her gas purchases dedicated to production with of
her gas-ﬁred power plants.
The revenue stream in the power market at state s is thus deﬁned by
Ris = (pi
p
s − cis)qN,is + (pips − pig)qG,is + (pips − pg)qC,is
and the share of the total purchases that will be used in each market is
decided on in the optimization of the ﬁrm's proﬁts fulﬁlling
V i ≤ Ai − qC,is
The proﬁt-maximization problem of market players can be represented by
the following program:
max
R,V,qN ,qG,qC
{
(pig − pg)V i + U(Ris)
}
s.t. Ris = (pi
p
s − cis)qN,is + (pips − pig)qG,is + (pips − pg)qC,is : µis
qN,is ≤ qN,imax : µN,is (1)
V i ≤ Ai − qC,is : µgas,is
0 ≤ qG,is : µmin,is
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In addition, we consider the inverse demand curves both the short-term gas
market and the power market:
pips = pi
p
0 − αps
∑
i
(qN,is + q
G,i
s + q
C,i
s ) (2)
for the power market and
pig = pig0 − αg
∑
i
V i (3)
for the gas market.
3. Incentives for cross-industry input foreclosure
Gas-ﬁred generators often purchase much of their gas supplies in the long-
term gas market. We assume that this market is liquid enough, so no ﬁrm
in the demand side has the ability to manipulate it. In that view, none of
the companies operating in the short-term gas market, selling gas to the end
customers, would have any inﬂuence on the price that the electricity produc-
ers pay for their long-term gas, and both segments of the demand (end users
and power producers) would become in practice two completely separated
markets. Considering the market for long-term supplies alone, vertical inte-
gration provides no additional opportunity to exercise market power, since
the electricity price is independent from the price in the short- gas market
that gas oligopolists control.
In that situation, we ﬁnd that:
Result 1 (No cross-industry input foreclosure). Given that player's behavior
is described by problem (1), if no ﬁrm is producing with opportunity gas, there
are no opportunities of input foreclosure.
The equilibrium gas price is given by the Cournot pricing condition for the
short-term gas market:
pig = pg + αgV i (4)
This result is derived in the Appendix.
However, gas-ﬁred power plants usually need to buy some extra gas in the
short-term gas market in order to compensate for deviations from their ex-
pected plans. And this opportunity gas (short-term gas) needs to be bought
in the market that oligopolists control. This is a potential case for input
foreclosure. In that view, the simplest situation of input foreclosure would
describe a gas monopolist that also owns a power company. A raise in the
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price of gas automatically implies a raise in the cost of fuel for the combined
cycle generators and, depending on the load curve, a raise in the electricity
price of some hours. The monopolist beneﬁts from three factors: a higher
price for the gas it sells directly to customers in balance with a loss of
income derived from a reduction in consumption; a higher price for the gas
it sells for power generation in balance with a reduction in the production
of the gas-ﬁred units as they become more expensive; and a higher price for
the rest of the electricity it is producing. The ﬁrst two terms are the same
ones that any equivalent monopolist faces when competing against demand
elasticity, but the third one is a direct consequence of vertical integration,
and it is providing extra beneﬁts when the gas price is raised. This means
that there is an additional incentive for the ﬁrm to raise gas prices. In other
words, the quantity that is aﬀected by an increase in gas prices is not just the
amount of gas sales as it happens in the problem of the gas monopolist. It
is related to his electricity sales, especially those coming from non-gas-ﬁred
generators. This represents a worsening eﬀect on the market abuse conditions
that arises when the gas monopolist integrates with an electricity ﬁrm.
However, short-term gas markets do not correspond to the relatively simple
setting above. In our setting, the previous example is a particular case of it,
so it reﬂects the factors that explain the interdependence between the gas
price and the electricity price. In particular, we can derive from the model
the following result:
Result 2 (Cross-industry input foreclosure). Given that player's behavior is
described by problem (1), if K ﬁrms including ﬁrm i are buying opportunity
gas in the short-term market, ﬁrm i has two additional incentives: a) the loss
of proﬁts associated with the higher gas price for her own gas-ﬁred power
plants and b) the increase of proﬁts associated with the increase in infra-
marginal rents.
The equilibrium contains the following pricing condition for the short-term
gas market:
pig − pg =αg(V i − Ei,∗[qG,i])+
αgEi,∗
[(
K
N + 1
(qN,i + qG,i + qC,i)
)]
− (5)∑
s
µgas,is
This result is also derived in the Appendix.
As shown in the Appendix, Ei,∗ represents the risk-neutral expectation of
player i for the power market. In addition, the Lagrange multiplier µgas,is
represents the trade-oﬀ between increasing marginally V i (supplying one
megawatt more to the short-term gas market) and using the contracted gas
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to produce electricity. Hence, when ﬁrms are deciding on short-term sales in
the gas market, they take account of the opportunity costs of selling in the
future power market. That opportunity cost is given by (see the Appendix
for the details of the derivation):∑
s
µgas,is = E
i,∗[pip − αp(qN,i + qG,i + qC,i)]− pg
which is the risk neutral expectation of marginal proﬁts in the power market
associated with using contracted gas to produce electricity. Note that if there
is spare long-term gas in all states of nature,
∑
s µ
gas,i
s = 0 and the expression
reduces to the (risk-aﬀected) Cournot pricing equation of the power market,
using the long-term gas price as the cost for ﬁring the power plant.
By analogy with the ﬁrst result, we observe two additional terms, which
represents the eﬀects of vertical integration. In particular:
• The term αgEi,∗[qG,i] describes player i's valuation of the possibility
of using opportunity gas in the future power market. And this player's
valuation is the risk-neutral expectation of future consumption of op-
portunity gas.
• The term αgEi,∗
[(
K
N+1(q
N,i + qG,i + qC,i)
)]
describes how changes in
the oligopolistic behavior in the electricity market aﬀect the agent's
proﬁt. It represents the increase in proﬁts due to the increase in power
prices associated with raising rivals' fuel costs. As shown in the Ap-
pendix, KsN+1α
g describes the increase in power prices in state s when
gas sales decreases marginally, i.e. the ability of ﬁrm i to raise the
power price through decisions in the gas market. Firm i's electricity
production qN,i+qG,i+qC,i represents the incentives of the power price.
This last term is the increased market power due to the fact that raising the
price of the gas market aﬀects the electricity market. The value of this latter
term depends on the value of K, i.e. the number of ﬁrms producing with
opportunity gas, which is uncertain when deciding in the gas market. If all
the generating ﬁrms are using this gas K and input foreclosure is maximized.
The more opportunity gas consumers, the more additional market power for
the ﬁrm i.
Consequently, the oligopolistic eﬀects described by (Result 2) is threefold. On
the one hand it represents the usual horizontal eﬀect of the market power,
that is, withholding gas output forces the gas price to raise. On the other
hand, it shows one of the eﬀects of vertical integration: when the ﬁrm raise
the gas price, the marginal cost of its electricity production is risen as well.
This would tend to lower gas prices. And ﬁnally, the ability of gas suppliers
to aﬀect the behavior of other players in the electricity market and to beneﬁt
from it.
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4. Network allocation mechanisms and transmission
services flexibility
The key parameter to deﬁne input-foreclosure eﬀects is the amount of ﬁrms
buying opportunity gas in the short-term market, deﬁned byK. These power
producers have to choose between limiting themselves severely to the gas
the have bought in the long term, or buying to some of the ﬁrms controlling
the short-term gas market (and thus creating the incentives for input fore-
closure). Hence, the additional potential for input foreclosure that we had
identiﬁed is based on the idea that a part of the gas for these combined cycles
has to be bought in a small market controlled by incumbents. This creates
a local oligopoly for these sales that results in the conﬂictive incentives.
We will next analyze the diﬀerent schemes to implement mechanisms to allo-
cate network resources, in order to identify the determinants of the creation
of such local oligopolies. In that view, gas market liberalization has been im-
plemented in signiﬁcantly diﬀerent ways, and most of those diﬀerences can
be traced to the diﬀerent mechanisms designed to allocate network services.
Gas networks operation is characterized by tight technical constraints, and
hence the contracting architecture required to implement the commodity de-
livery at diﬀerent points of the network must be complex. This is the source
of signiﬁcant transaction costs. In particular, dealing with spatial speciﬁcity
has motivated a wide range of design solutions, Vazquez et al. (2012).
In that view, it is possible to reduce the speciﬁcity of each feasible trade by
simplifying its spatial characteristics. By doing so, the diﬃculties to trade
are reduced and the number of market players trading the same product in-
creases. That simpliﬁcation strategy, on the other hand, implies that several
network services will be allocated equally among all network users regard-
less their preferences. This in turn creates ineﬃciencies that may result in
barriers to cross-border trade.
4.1. Spatial flexibility and capacity allocation
The less simpliﬁed mechanism to allocate network resources is a point-to-
point gas transmission arrangement. In it, a large part of the spatial char-
acteristics of the trade is deﬁned in the agreement. Hence, point-to-point
transmission is relatively diﬃcult to trade. This is the typical scheme fol-
lowed in the US and Australian gas markets. Both systems are supposed to
allocate most of the spatial characteristics of the network using market-based
mechanisms, although both systems diﬀer in several fundamental features.
The US system is based on long-term bilateral agreements between pipeline
operators and network users, complemented with liquid short-term trading
of capacity, Makholm (2012). The Australian system, on the other hand,
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uses an implicit mechanism to allocate capacity in the short run. The mech-
anisms can be viewed as a combinatorial auction where network capacity is
allocated implicitly according to gas prices, Ruﬀ (2012). Under suﬃciently
liquid secondary trading and absence of transaction costs, it is possible to
consider that both schemes are equivalent in terms of short-term eﬃciency2,
as they both consider the spatial characteristics of the network.
The EU design may be viewed as a third way that aims to combine the char-
acteristics of the two schemes. It is characterized by a combination of explicit
and implicit allocation of gas transmission services, Vazquez et al. (2012).
Such combination is built on the explicit allocation of only some of transmis-
sion services. The allocation mechanism is called entry/exit allocation. The
idea behind it is to simplify the network topology to a simpler set of entry
and exit points (a commercial network that represent partially the physical
network). All explicit allocation is reduced to buying separately entry and
exit rights. After that, shippers do not need to buy additional transmission
rights (such as ﬂexibility rights) but they are allocated implicitly according
to a set of rules deﬁned by the regulator. Such allocation mechanism is called
virtual hub. With it, one avoids the explicit allocation and renegotiation of
complex spatial characteristics of the network, but it comes at the cost of
the creation of trading zones, which concentrates network constraints at the
zone borders.
4.2. Identifying barriers to cross-border trade in European
systems
Entry/exit schemes market players only reveal preferences on the right to
enter and exit the gas systems. Within the system, all injections and with-
drawals are considered to have the same price. From the point of view of
this paper, the main characteristic is that it gives network users free spatial
ﬂexibility within the system, which in turn creates barriers to cross-border
trade.
4.2.1. Capacity allocation
Entry-exit regimes may be thought of as a system where transmission con-
straints are moved to the borders. That is, entry-exit capacity allocation
calculates the network capacity that allows shippers to trade within the
zone without transmission constraints. In practice, the transmission capac-
ity oﬀered to market participants has to be lower than the physical limits
2See Hallack and Vazquez (2012) for discussion on additional eﬀects of those two dif-
ferent schemes.
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of the transmission system. This under-use of transmission capacity is part
of the design, which bears that cost in order to promote zonal market liq-
uidity (by giving spatial ﬂexibility). But the entry/exit system also implies
an increase of the transmission constraints in the cross-border. The capacity
made commercially available at the borders has to be lower than the phys-
ical capacity of interconnection. Hence, the within-zone network ﬂexibility
entails a barrier for cross-border trade.
Consider for instance an injection at a certain entry point A. Giving the right
to the shipper of trading everywhere within the zone containing A implies
that the capacity sold at A is lower than the physical capacity. Consider the
same situation in a diﬀerent zone with an entry point B. If a trader were
willing to enter through point A, but to sell in the zone of point B, the
trader would be facing a reduction of capacity twice. That is, the problem
of underused capacity is faced twice with cross-border trade between two
entry/exit zones: a ﬁrst one when injecting at A and a second one when
injecting at B. This represents a barrier to cross-border trade.
4.2.2. Network tariﬀs
In entry/exit systems, the costs of the network cannot be allocated accord-
ing to the actual use of the network, because the prices for entry and exit
points on the commercial network do not represent the costs generated by
the physical gas ﬂows that they generate. Consequently, one always ﬁnds
cross-subsidies among shippers, which are caused by the spatial ﬂexibility
given inside the trading zone. In that view, tariﬀs are not cost-reﬂective, but
that may be a bearable cost when compared to the increase of within-zone
liquidity.
However entry/exit systems create tariﬀ distortions that are especially rele-
vant when crossing zones. This often results in higher costs for a cross-zone
trade. Actually, network users are charged several entry and exit charges in
multiple zones, which may result in 'pancaking', meaning that multiple tariﬀs
are added on a single transaction. Put it diﬀerently, spatial ﬂexibility is given
to shippers at the entry to all zones. And the network tariﬀs paid at each
entry cannot be cost-reﬂective, often resulting in cross-subsidies. Therefore,
a shipper crossing two zones would face the diﬃculty twice. Thus, those non-
cost-reﬂective tariﬀs increase the costs of cross-zone trade as compared to
the costs of gas trade within the zone. The eﬀects of tariﬀ distortion increase
when crossing zones, creating additional barriers to trade3.
3Besides, costs associated with imbalances are also paid according to zones, so be-
ing imbalanced in a trade within a zone requires the payment of one charge. The same
imbalance in a cross-zone trade means the payment of two charges.
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5. Implications: Effects of different designs of
network services
Summing up, we have identiﬁed additional potential for short-term input
foreclosure with local oligopolies that exist only in the short run. Besides,
we have showed that markets designs providing spatial ﬂexibility to shippers
facilitate the existence of those local oligopolies. In that view, the US and
Australia markets rely on point-to-point transmission allocation. This in
turn implies that the spatial ﬂexibility provided by the network rules is
minimal. So if the network is meshed enough, it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd situations
where a certain consumption point is subject to input foreclosure. But if that
consumption point is connected to the network through, for instance, a single
pipeline, it is possible to ﬁnd situations where a large gas supplier purchase
gas in the hub and exercise market power at the isolated consumption point.
On the other hand, in the EU gas systems, market designs do provide ample
spatial ﬂexibility. Moreover, the zone where free spatial ﬂexibility is given
is limited to zone borders, which are often equivalent to national borders.
That is, within a certain national system, market participants can trade gas
without network constraints. This in turn implies that network constraints
are moved to national borders, creating barriers to cross-border trade. Those
barriers to cross-border trade represents additional potential for the existence
of isolated national systems.
Put it diﬀerently, the deﬁnition of network services within zones of trade
creates advantages for within-zone trading, but discourages cross-zone trad-
ing. This reinforces the incentives of players in speciﬁc zones to keep their
trade within the zone. The diﬃculties to cross-zone trade can be softened
by increasing the size of the zones (increasing the network simpliﬁcation and
its associated costs) or by decreasing the simpliﬁcation. Usually, increasing
the size of the zones is considerably diﬃcult, as the costs of the ineﬃciency
associated with that strategy are often thought to be prohibitively large.
In that view, assume that we could implement a more eﬃcient (in the sense
of giving less free spatial ﬂexibility) management of the gas network, so inter-
national traders (players outside the initially isolated national market) would
face the same network costs as any other player. That would allow them to
make opportunity deals with the national companies without committing to
very long-term agreements of network capacity. If the international traders
had easy access to the national gas grid, then there would be plenty of po-
tential sellers willing to participate in the opportunity gas market. As the
supply side of the short-term market is more competitive, most of the gas of
the electricity producers would be priced at values that could not be inﬂu-
enced by gas suppliers, thus eliminating the potential for input foreclosure.
Therefore, as entry/exit capacity allocation creates barriers to cross-border
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trade, it facilitates the existence of local oligopolies, and local oligopolies was
the source of the case for input foreclosure that we identiﬁed in the previ-
ous section. Hence, entry/exit capacity allocation increases the potential for
input foreclosure.
In general, determining the relevant market in the short run is critical to
assess the potential for input foreclosure. Even when long-term markets are
competitive enough, lack of liquidity in short-term trading of network ca-
pacity may create opportunities for input foreclosure. Put it diﬀerently, if
transmission capacity may not be available in the short run, one may ﬁnd
isolated oligopolies where potential for input foreclosure exists, regardless
the competitiveness of the long-term markets. But, if transmission alloca-
tion mechanisms provide free spatial ﬂexibility, these isolated zones may be
motivated by the rules of network use deﬁned in the regulation. Hence, this
is an additional cost that should be taken into account when deciding on the
rules of network use.
6. Conclusion
The analysis above shows that the key factor in the existence of a case for
input foreclosure is the ability of a gas agent to manipulate the gas price faced
by her competitors in the power market. There are essentially two cases for
input foreclosure. The ﬁrst one is related to a certain ﬁrm with position
both in the upstream gas market and in the power market. This is the case
described in Hunger (2003). The second one, described in this paper, has to
do with a market structure where several ﬁrms need to purchase short-term
gas supplies in a local oligopoly. In that situation, power producers have
to choose between limiting themselves severely to the gas they have bought
in the long run, or buying from some of the ﬁrms operating in the local
short-term market.
By identifying the second type of input-foreclosure situations, we have shown
that the particular design of the gas market has a critical inﬂuence on the
existence of cases for input foreclosure. In particular, giving free spatial ﬂexi-
bility moves congestion to national borders, creating in turn barriers to trade
in the short run. Thus, EU market designs, which builds on ample provision
of free spatial ﬂexibility, creates barriers to cross-border trade, and hence
potential for the existence of isolated national markets where there are op-
portunities to foreclose the market. This is not the case of systems based on
point-to-point transmission.
Therefore, if cross-border barriers are weaken, so that international traders
have easy access to the national gas grid, then there will be more poten-
tial sellers willing to participate in the short-term gas market. Competition
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among them would limit the ability of national ﬁrms to manipulate the short-
term price. Hence, electricity producers would be priced at values that could
not be inﬂuenced by the national companies, eliminating the potential for
input foreclosure. This is an additional cost that must be taken into account
when deciding on the design of the capacity allocation mechanism.
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Appendix
A. Representation of players' behavior
In this section we characterize the opportunities of players to behave strate-
gically. To do so, we analyze the optimality conditions of problem (1). The
Lagrangean function of problem (1) is given by:
L =(pig − pg)V i + U(Ris)+
µis{Ris − (pips − cis)qN,is − (pips − pig)qG,is − (pips − pg)qC,is }+
µN,is {qN,is − qN,imax}+
µgas,is {V i −Ai + qC,is }+
µmin,is {0− qG,is }
In addition, using the inverse demand equation (2) and (3), we have the
following price derivatives:
∂pips
∂qx,is
= −αg and ∂pi
g
∂V i
= −αg
where qx,is is power production with any kind of fuel.
A.1. Risk-neutral expectations
The optimality of problem 1 with respect to revenues Ris gives the deﬁnition
of the Lagrange multipliers µis:
∂U(Ris)
∂Ris
= µis (6)
As Lagrange multipliers are marginal utilities at date 0 of an additional unit
of spot proﬁts, they can be thought of as discount factors for each state
of nature. No-arbitrage conditions impose that each µis are positive values.
That is equivalent to the condition that the problem has a solution, see for
instance Magill and Quinzi (2002).
The relationship between the previous discount factors and risk-neutral prob-
abilities is straightforward. Consider the values λi =
∑S
s=1 µ
i
s and deﬁne the
parameters φis =
µis
λi
. As each φis are positive values and they sum up to
one, they can be thought of as probabilities. Thus, a certain value deﬁned
by X =
∑
s µ
i
sxs can be rewritten as X = λ
i
∑
s φ
i
sxs = λ
iEN [x], where EN
denotes the expectation with respect to the previously deﬁned probabilities,
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and λi can be interpreted as the discount on the riskless asset. That is, the
forward price is its discounted expected payoﬀ in the sense of artiﬁcially
constructed probabilities. We will use E∗ to denote discounted expectations,
Ei,∗ = λiEN .
A.2. Optimality with respect to gas sales in the short-term
gas market (V i)
pig−pg−αgV i+
∑
s
µgas,is =
∑
s
µis
(
∂pips
∂V i
(qN,is + q
G,i
s + q
C,i
s )− αgqG,is
)
(7)
From the above equation, it is possible to identify a ﬁrst expression of the
eﬀects of vertical integration between gas and electricity. That is, a problem
where ∂pi
p
s
∂V i
= 0 would yield
pig − pg − αg(V i −
∑
s
µisq
G,i
s ) +
∑
s
µgas,is = 0
The Lagrange multiplier µgas,is represents the trade-oﬀ between increasing
marginally V i (supplying one megawatt more to the short-term gas market)
and using the contracted gas to produce electricity. Hence, this equation
states that the costs taken in to account when deciding on short-term sales
in the gas market are made up of the price in the long-term market pg and
the opportunity costs of selling in the future power market
∑
s µ
gas,i
s .
The incentive to raise the gas price is deﬁned, on the one hand, by the
beneﬁts for the ﬁrm's gas sales V i, and on the other by the additional costs
of buying opportunity gas at a higher price, qG,is . As the power market is
subject to uncertainty, that incentive is deﬁned by
∑
s µ
i
sq
G,i
s , which is the
player's valuation of the possibility of using opportunity gas in the future
power market. This player's valuation is the risk-neutral expectation of future
consumption of opportunity gas, so that
pig − pg − αg(V i − Ei,∗[qG,i]) +
∑
s
µgas,is = 0
Therefore, when ∂pi
p
s
∂V i
= 0, market participants play Cournot strategies, tak-
ing into account the extra cost associated with the fuel used to produce
electricity. In that view, the main eﬀects of vertical integration that we are
considering in this paper are represented by the term ∂pi
p
s
∂V i
.
A.3. Optimality with respect to the electricity production
from gas contracted in advance (qC,is )
µis{pips − pg − αps(qN,is + qG,is + qC,is )} = µgas,is (8)
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As µgas,is represents the opportunity costs of selling in the future power mar-
ket, this condition states that an optimal amount of gas is allocated to the
short-term gas market when the marginal value of gas in this market µgas,is
is equal to the marginal value of gas in the electricity market. Summing over
all states of nature, the previous condition can be rewritten as
Ei,∗[pip − αp(qN,i + qG,i + qC,i)]− pg =
∑
s
µgas,is (9)
That is, the expected marginal value in the power market is equal to the
opportunity cost with respect to the gas market.
A.4. Optimality with respect to power production with from
opportunity gas (qG,is )
µis{pips − pig − αps(qN,is + qG,is + qC,is )} = −µmin,is (10)
µmin,is measures the extra costs associated with producing using opportunity
gas. Hence, this condition states that the marginal value of producing with
opportunity gas in the power market equals the cost associated with it.
A.5. Optimality with respect to power production with
non-gas-fired power plants (qN,is )
µis{pips − cis − αps(qN,is + qG,is + qC,is )} = µN,is (11)
For the sake of simplicity, we assume in the paper that some production
with gas-ﬁred power plants is always required, so that µN,is 6= 0. If µN,is = 0,
the marginal cost of the power system would be cis, so that and µ
min,i
s =
µis(pi
g
s − cis). However, to have a coherent representation of such situation, it
would be necessary to add a constraint on the minimum value of production
from contracted gas. The assumption has no eﬀect on the results developed
in the paper, but it is convenient for the sake of simplicity.
B. Power price sensitivity with respect to gas sales
We may identify the eﬀects associated with vertical integration as∑
s
µis
(
∂pips
∂V i
(qN,is + q
G,i
s + q
C,i
s )− αgqG,is
)
That expression will be next analyzed in detail.
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The price equation in the power market is given by
pips = pi
p
0 − αps
∑
i
(qN,is + q
G,i
s + q
C,i
s )
and the optimality condition (10) can be rewritten as
qN,is + q
G,i
s + q
C,i
s =
1
αps
(pips − pigs ) +
1
µisα
p
s
µmin,is (12)
Putting together the equations (8) and (10), it is possible to obtain
µis(pi
g − pg) = µgas,is + µmin,is
We can identify two basic cases:
• A certain state of nature s has spare long-term gas. In this case,
µmin,is > 0 as the minimum production constraint of opportunity gas
will be active. Besides, µgas,is = 0 because the ﬁrm is using less gas
than contracted, so the corresponding constraint will not be active.
From above we have that
µmin,is = µ
i
s(pi
g − pg)
• A certain state of nature s has spare long-term gas. This is the com-
plementary case of the previous one. As ﬁrms are producing with op-
portunity gas, µmin,is = 0. On the other hand, as all contracted gas is
used, µgas,is > 0. In particular,
µgas,is = µ
i
s(pi
g − pg)
B.1. Price sensitivity when no firm is using opportunity gas
If the ﬁrm is not using opportunity gas, because the gas contracted in the
long-term is enough to serve the gas and electricity markets, then µmin,is > 0.
In those scenarios, V i < Ai − qC,is because there will be spare gas, and thus
µgas,is = 0. Using the optimality conditions
qN,is + q
G,i
s + q
C,i
s =
1
αps
(pips − pigs ) +
1
αps
pigs =
1
αps
pips (13)
As the power price equation does not depend on the gas price,
∂pips
∂V i
= 0
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B.2. Price sensitivity when firms need to use opportunity gas
If ﬁrm i is actually consuming opportunity gas at that state s, µmin,is = 0.
Thus
pips = pi
p
0 − αps
∑
i
1
αps
(pips − pigs )
In that view, the price sensitivity will depend on the number of ﬁrms that
are consuming opportunity gas. Let us use the parameter Ks to denote the
number of ﬁrms purchasing gas in the short run, at state s. Thus,
pips = pi
p
0 − (Npips −Kspigs )
Hence,
pips =
1
N + 1
pip0 +
Ks
N + 1
pigs (14)
From the previous expression,
∂pips
∂V i
=
Ks
N + 1
∂pigs
∂V i
=
Ks
N + 1
αgs (15)
That is, the power price reacts proportionally to the amount of ﬁrms us-
ing opportunity gas, divided by the number of ﬁrms plus one, because it
takes into account also the demand reaction. Note that if no ﬁrm is using
opportunity gas, Ks = 0 and hence
∂pips
∂V i
= 0.
C. Representation of input foreclosure opportunities
Combining both results we can derive (Result 1) and (Result 2). In particular,
optimality condition (7) can be written as:
pig− pg−αgV i+
∑
s
µgas,is =
∑
s
µis
(
Ks
N + 1
αg(qN,is + q
G,i
s + q
C,i
s )− αgqG,is
)
Reordering the term and using the expression for risk-neutral expectations,
we obtain (Result 2):
pig − pg =αg(V i − Ei,∗[qG,i])+
αgEi,∗
[(
K
N + 1
(qN,i + qG,i + qC,i)
)]
−∑
s
µgas,is
When no ﬁrm is attending to the short-term gas market, both Ei,∗[qG,i] = 0
and Ks = 0. Moreover, as not buying opportunity gas means that the ﬁrm
has spare contracted gas,
∑
s µ
gas,i
s = 0. Thus, we obtain (Result 1):
pig = pg + αgV i
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